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The first time I participated in a psychological experiment on mind-wandering, I was 
so bored that I actually can’t remember it all that well. This might not say much for my 
skills as an empirical social scientist, but in my defense I will say that: (1) when I 
participated it was not actually as a social scientist; I was just helping someone out; but 
more importantly (2) I can at least recall my dominant affective state – which is to say: 
boredom, annoyance, frustration – even if the details of what I actually did, the 
substantive content of the experiment, remain vague. I remember that I was sat in front 
of a laptop for an hour (?) and I had to look at some kind of shape, appearing and 
disappearing on the screen, with an instruction to click when one shape was slightly 
different from the previous – something like that, but in truth, it’s all a bit fuzzy. I just 
remember it being intensely boring, really excessively boring – as if someone had gone 
out of their way to design an experiment so mind-crushingly tedious that your thoughts 
inevitably began to wander elsewhere, and yet requiring, at irregular intervals, just 
enough of your attention, calling you back with just that little occasional tap of the 
finger, that some part of you always remained, somehow, present.  
Historically, being an experimental subject in psychology has generally meant 
attending to some object or task. It is precisely the transformation of experimental 
relations into “relations between stimulus and consciousness” that make an 
experimental psychology thinkable in the first place (Mandler 60). That transformation 
has been widely successful: still today, as Jill Morawski points out, the experiment 
enjoys a “status [that] surpasses all other contenders for the production of scientific 
knowledge about the psyche” (78). And yet there are issues. Not least, as Kurt Danziger 
argued some years ago, there is the human factor, i.e. “the interaction of experimenters 
with the human sources of their data,” which often belies the neat traffic between 
stimulus, subject, and researcher (9). But the question of how a human subject can, in 
fact, unproblematically produce reliable data on a cognitive phenomenon, in relation to 
a pre-defined stimulus or task, is posed in a particular way, and with special acuteness, 
when researchers address that psychological state we know as mind-wandering. 
Because mind-wandering is about mental life in the absence of stimulation: it is about 
being distracted, or wandering off, without conscious intention, from whatever it is you 
were supposed to be doing in the first place; it is the experience, as Smallwood and 
Schooler put it in a foundational psychological paper, of a mind “drifting away from a 
task toward unrelated inner thoughts, fantasies, feelings, and other musings” (946). 
Thus, as Felicity Callard and her colleagues have pointed out, does the stimulus- and 
task-based history of the psychological experiment make trouble for an experimental 
psychology of mind-wandering. How could the phenomenon of inattention be other 
than consigned to opacity, after all, given its entanglement in an experimental procedure 
constructed precisely around an individual subject’s capacity to attend? 
In this short article, I want to take that trouble, and use it as a vantage-point for 
thinking about the experiment, as a genre, in interdisciplinary times. I am especially 
interested in what it might mean to inhabit – and make sense of – experimental space, 
while grounded in an intellectual practice (literature, sociology, human geography) that 
is usually excluded from (indeed, defined by its exclusion from) precisely that space. I 
do not wish to fetishize this term – but I do want to lean on a suggestion that Felicity 
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Callard and I have made elsewhere, which is that the experiment may yet offer 
surprisingly fertile territory for interdisciplinary thought and practice. In a moment of 
conservative retrenchment towards discipline in literary studies and elsewhere (see e.g. 
Kramnick), I extend that gambit to ask: can an attention to mind-wandering 
experiments, and interdisciplinary interventions into those experiments, help us now to 
think in more speculative, capacious ways about how we might re-map the ground 
across interdisciplinarity and collaboration? 
 
Designing experiments 
Today, most mind-wandering experiments take place at the intersection of the 
psychological and brain sciences, and under the aegis of a cognitive neuroscience (see 
Bennett and Hacker). Within these sciences, the landscape of experiment is recounted 
and produced in very particular ways. Take pedagogical texts, for example: in their 
instructional account of fMRI experimental design (fMRI, or functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, is the most widely used brain-imaging method in cognitive 
neuroscience), Matt Carter and Jennifer C. Shieh take the student through the steps of 
selecting dependent and independent variables, designing an appropriate task paradigm, 
recruiting human subjects, collecting and analyzing data, and so on – to argue that, in 
fMRI brain-imaging, an investigator designs an experiment “to answer a specific 
question or test a specific hypothesis”; that she “designs a proper task paradigm and 
tests efficacy of the stimuli so that the results are appropriate and accurate” (24). 
Similarly, and dating – as convention dictates – the emergence of experimental 
psychology to Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig in the 1870s, Alice Healy and 
Robert Proctor argue that psychology’s experimental inheritance is grounded in the 
manipulation and control of variables for the discovery of causal relations: “the primary 
methodological goal of most research in psychology has been the exertion of as much 
control as possible,” they argue, “so that the general idea of the experiment as the ideal 
research tool is still widely accepted in psychology” (xiii). I am struck, here, by the 
expression of very clear ideas about neuroscience as an experimental science, about 
science itself as a necessarily experimental practice, and about the logics of propriety, 
certainty, and control that hold these two together. As Mary Harrington puts it in her 
textbook, The Design of Experiments in Neuroscience: “science consists of ideas that 
change based on observations or experiments. Whereas pseudoscience lacks organized 
skepticism, and the mechanisms for acquiring new knowledge are vague, the basis of 
science is organized skepticism through replicable experiments and observations” (6). 
Roger Smith once argued that the production of psychology (and now 
neuroscience) as an academic and scientific pursuit has been the self-conscious labour 
of such texts at least since Edwin Boring’s canonical History in the 1920s. As someone 
working tentatively to collaborate with neuroscientists in experimental spaces focused 
on mind-wandering, my concern is with how, and to what effect, the student of 
neuroscience is given to imagine her experiment as the seamless and linear progress of 
logic, observation, and control. My interest is not in the design of these experiments as 
such (which, in practice, obviously deviates from these pedagogical certainties) nor is 
it in the philosophy or the history of science. My interest, more prosaically sociological, 
has to do with what this image of the experiment does. I am interested in what 
affordances it offers and what horizons it curtails. I am especially interested in the forms 
of subjectivity, experience, and authority that it demands of the experimenter herself.  
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Making experiments 
Since the early 1970s, the Science and Technology Studies scholar, Harry Collins, has 
been concerned with experiments on the detection of gravitational waves – waves 
produced by ripples of space-time, predicted by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, 
and in fact detected by the LIGO Scientific Collaboration, to great international acclaim 
in 2016 (the LIGO Scientific Collaboration [LSC] is a large international collaboration 
of physicists working to detect gravitational waves). For Collins, experiments on 
gravitational waves have long raised important questions of communication and 
replication vis-à-vis novel phenomena. An experiment is replicated when tacit 
knowledge is transferred, and the outcome demonstrated once more. But when someone 
attempts to repeat the detection of a new phenomenon, it is no longer clear what to make 
of failed replication. The dispute comes to be decided not on the results themselves, but 
on a negotiation of what counts as a well-done experiment (“Seven Sexes” 216). In this 
negotiation, apparatus and outcome are tied together in a loop: you can only detect the 
object if you have built the right experimental apparatus; you only know you have built 
the right experimental apparatus if you detect the object, and so on (Changing Order 
84). What is key for Collins is that this loop is managed by conventions that are cultural 
and political in nature – that they are not (only) scientific, as such. And the attention of 
the sociologist interested in experiments is turned not to scientific results or practices 
but rather (Collins here quotes Peter McHugh’s On the Failure of Positivism) 
“linguistic, conceptual, and social behaviour” (“Seven Sexes” 220; see also “Son of 
Seven Sexes”).  
This view of the experiment has been highly influential in science studies. But 
I do not know how well such an explicitly socio-logical account of experimentation can 
help us to intervene in the neuroscience of mind-wandering. The historian of science, 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, offers two alternative proposals in his account of experimental 
systems: first, Rheinberger rejects the idea that what is at stake in experiments is 
hypothesis-testing. For Rheinberger, delineation between question and answer, input 
and result, is much more open, and much more emergent, than is often admitted 
(Epistemic Things 65). Indeed, experimental cultures are aimed precisely at emergence 
(“Cultures of Experimentation” 292). Second, Rheinberger shifts our focus from 
concepts to materials, from concept-work to the “material units” that bench-scientists 
are in relation with (Epistemic Things 225). The action of the experiment is then in the 
interplay between what Rheinberger calls “epistemic things” (the actual objects of 
inquiry, still unresolved) and “technical objects,” which form the background 
instruments and techniques (Epistemic Things 28-29). For Collins, we could say, and 
to be simplistic about it, the search for novelty is caught in a socio-logical arrangement 
of apparatus and object; for Rheinberger, it is in the more-than-social interplay of 
epistemic thing and technical object that novelty actually happens. It is in the dance of 
instrument and thing that something new comes into the world. 
 
Writing experiments 
Let me come at this from another direction: some years ago, showing the unerring 
sympathy for middle-class habit that he has since spun into a substantial fortune, the 
novelist Jonathan Franzen entered a critique of experimental (or “difficult”) literature. 
The trouble with experimentation, says Franzen, is that it breaks the implicit contract 
with the “bourgeois reader not to overtax her.” Fiction, in fact, is “storytelling, and our 
reality arguably consists of the stories we tell about ourselves.” Rather than offering 
anything unexpected or new, the novel is imagined as something inherently 
“conservative and conventional.”  In response to these remarkable claims, Ben Marcus 
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suggested that Franzen, having been drawn into the mass market by his own blind 
ambition, has become chained to its conventions – that he can only now live with 
himself by erasing any sense of an alternative; that the aggressively conventional 
realism of which he appoints himself spokesperson becomes sustainable only by 
obliterating any account of how things might be otherwise (43). What especially catches 
my attention about Marcus’s response, though, is that he wraps his own account of 
experimental literature in a vision of – of all things – the brain, and especially of 
Wernicke’s area, a part of the brain associated with language comprehension. For 
Marcus, reading is work, and specifically the working-out of a cerebral muscle: “a 
writer labouring intensely to produce art from words,” says Marcus, “would almost 
certainly hope for an active Wernicke’s area, rather than an atrophied one, on the part 
of his [sic.] reader” ( 40).  
One of the central contrasts Marcus draws in his criticism of Franzen is that 
between a realist corpus invested in reproduction, and an experimental approach 
seeking novelty. But this does not seem quite adequate. In the midst of a conversation 
with the cognitive neuroscientist, Sophie Scott, the poet James Wilkes diffracts the 
same distinction in another direction: taking the desire for replication as a contrast 
between his own experiments in poetry and Scott’s neuroscientific experiments, Wilkes 
asks: “I mean, why would you want to replicate a poem?” (334). But then he chides 
himself for such “complacent ignorance” and notes that there may, in fact, be good 
reasons for such an act. Replication, Wilkes argues, might be a sign of possibility too – 
an indication that there is “never an end” of experimental practice (335). Here is then a 
very different view of the cerebral muscle working itself out – always repeating the 
same actions, and yet becoming slightly remade every time. Wilkes reminds us, 
following Joan Retallack, not to rely on a simple fortuitousness in the use of the same 
word, experiment, across the arts and sciences, nor to use that same term only to invoke 
a sophomoric political desire for the avant-garde (see Hong). He reminds the would-be 
experimenter to avoid both a glib identity and an unearned distinction – to remain fixed 
on the very real and always-incomplete interlacing of experimental thought and 
practice, across very different epistemological and disciplinary trajectories.  
 
Inter/Experiments 
What does it mean to be a sociologist, or an historian, or a cultural geographer, in 
experimental space? Is there room, within all I have considered here, to conjure a new 
kind of experimental situation across these practices and the brain sciences? In which 
case, what would it mean to enact such experiments, not for their own sake, but because 
one is committed to the view that there are dense webs of mental, corporeal and social 
experience – mind-wandering, but not only mind-wandering – that are amenable to 
forms of cross-disciplinary experimentation in which the material and conceptual 
apparatus of the experiment (task; control; stimulation; replication; language) are not 
simply abandoned, but are rather diffracted in unexpected directions? Might such 
experiments then offer a more compelling and generative register for working across 
disciplines than that now dead and deadening term, “interdisciplinarity”? 
As I write, my colleagues, Hazel Morrison, Felicity Callard and I, with our 
neuroscientific and psychological interlocutors, have been thinking about mind-
wandering experiments in more-or-less these terms. Nothing of what we are doing is 
earth-shattering. One of our first interventions was to say that we could not simply rely 
on getting people distracted in the laboratory, but would try to find some way to engage 
their own heterogeneous accounts of what it was like for them to mind-wander at 
specific moments. This meant training them as participants to record their episodes, 
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conducting long semi-structured interviews, and beginning the hard work of 
interpretation needed to make sense of these. Lately, we have been aided by a 
suggestion in a pre-print from the psychologist Paul Seli and his colleagues that mind-
wandering might not be a unitary thing at all, but rather a “family of experiences,” 
which are nonetheless “held together by overlapping subsets of similarities” (24). For 
Seli and his colleagues, this much more open concept could still be constrained by – in 
their terms, “tethered” to – an experimental practice, by identifying “prototypical” cases 
of mind-wandering, i.e. experiences of mind-wandering featuring thoughts that are: “(a) 
not focused on an internal or external task (b) unguided, (c) and not closely tied to an 
immediate external stimulus” (25, 27). We are now coding our unconstrained 
qualitative data, to isolate prototypical cases so defined, hoping that this work might 
form a bridge between Seli’s experimental proposal and our own interventions – which 
may in turn help us to tether our unconstrained interview data to neuropsychological 
studies of mind-wandering, thereby, potentially, both expanding and clarifying the set 
of experiences that those studies are able to make visible.  
Again: I make no claims to astonishing novelty here. But the logic of an 
inter/experiment is that it uses the epistemological trajectories of different disciplines 
not as ways of thinking about experiments but as methods for expanding what might be 
possible within experiments – and doing so not in the self-congratulatory mode of 
experimental play, but as the serious work of producing and reproducing epistemic 
things. Obviously, this is far from sufficient; not least, it leaves open the question, 
recently posed by Will Viney, of what form of science we prefer, exactly, “when we 
enshrine the ‘experiment’ as a primary collaborative task/performance” (“1Q”). I take 
this questioning of the “experimental imperative” very seriously (Viney, “Not long 
now”). And yet still, “the chaotic interconnectedness of all things,” Joan Retallack 
reminds us (2007), sometimes “leads to the pragmatic necessity of ingenious 
experimentation as wager on the possibility of a viable, even pleasurable future together 
in this world.” What I have described here is perhaps too ordinary for such an 
emplotment. But it points at least to some attempt in that direction – some conviction 
that, on the other side of interdisciplinary and collaborative abrasion, there might still 
be experimental futures that we could learn to make together.  
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